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ABSTRACT 
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo make three important contributions to the literature on 
separation of powers in their new book.  First, they seek to rescue the unitary executive theory from 
the Bush administration lawyers, who have discredited the theory in the eyes of many by relying on 
it to support outlandish claims of presidential power that are unrelated to the unitary executive 
theory.  Second, they make a persuasive case for the unitary executive theory by explaining why a 
President must have the power to remove executive branch officers and to control policy making in 
the executive branch.  Third, they document the ways in which all forty-three of our Presidents 
have demonstrated their beliefs in the theory by consistently acting in accordance with the theory. 
In this review, I agree with most of the arguments that Calabresi and Yoo make, but I disagree 
with them on two points.  First, I do not believe that the President has the power to “veto” the 
decision of an executive branch officer.  I believe that his only recourse is to remove an officer with 
whom he disagrees.  Second,  I do not believe that the for-cause limits on the President’s removal 
powers that the Supreme Court has upheld interfere with the President’s ability to control policy 
making in the executive branch. 
I also make two other points.  First, political limits on the removal power often are formidable and 
are socially beneficial as a means of rendering the President accountable to the electorate.  Second, 
to the extent that the President’s ability to control policy making by “independent agencies” is 
unduly impaired, the root of that problem lies in unconstitutional statutory limits on the 
President’s appointment power rather than in the innocuous statutory limits on his removal power. 
Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo have made important con-
tributions to our understanding of allocation of powers among the 
branches of government in their book, The Unitary Executive.1  One of 
those contributions lies in their effort to rescue the unitary executive 
theory from those whose recent attempts to distort and to abuse it 
have produced an environment of extreme hostility toward anything 
that is tied to the theory.  During the Administration of President 
George W. Bush, many scholars, politicians, and members of the 
general public came to think of the unitary executive theory, as illus-
trated by the far-fetched claims of people like John Yoo, Jay Bybee, 
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David Addington, and Alberto Gonzales, that the President is om-
nipotent in his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.  As Jack Goldsmith 
has chronicled, President Bush’s lawyers claimed that the President 
could do anything he wanted to do in the context of the war against 
terror, including authorizing the torture of prisoners, and that his 
discretion was not limited by statutes and was not reviewable by 
courts.2 
The lawyers for the Bush administration often referred to their 
claims as supported by the unitary executive theory, but their claims 
are totally unrelated to the real unitary executive theory.  This mis-
leading use of the term has caused many scholars, politicians, and 
members of the public to develop understandable hostility toward 
any idea based on anything associated with something called the uni-
tary executive theory.  The Calabresi and Yoo book has the potential 
to restore respect for the unitary executive theory by disassociating it 
completely from the claims of presidential omnipotence that were 
made by the Bush administration. 
As Calabresi and Yoo explain, the unitary executive theory has a 
rich history that spans several centuries.  It has been embraced by 
many scholars with widely varying political philosophies.  It is not 
nearly as ambitious in its scope and effects as the spurious version of 
the theory that a few government lawyers have attempted to sell in re-
cent years.  The real unitary executive theory does not imply that the 
President has powers greater than the powers of Congress or the Ju-
diciary.  It refers to the belief of many scholars that the Vesting 
Clause of Article II confers on the President plenary power over pol-
icy making by all executive branch agencies and officials. 
Calabresi and Yoo seek to fill a void in the scholarly literature on 
the unitary executive theory.  Many scholars have discussed the the-
ory with reference to the text and history of the Constitution and to 
the famous cases in which the Court has resolved disputes relevant to 
the theory, but no one has attempted the daunting task of document-
ing the ways in which each President has actually implemented the 
theory.  Calabresi and Yoo describe their response to that gap in the 
literature: 
This book fills the void in the literature on executive branch practice 
by undertaking a comprehensive historical chronicle of the struggles be-
tween the president and Congress over control of the execution of fed-
 
 2 JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 144, 148–49 (2007) (noting that the Office of Legal Counsel had im-
plied that many federal laws that limit interrogation violated the President’s commander-
in-chief powers and were therefore unconstitutional and not binding). 
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eral law, beginning with the presidency of George Washington in 1789 
and concluding with the presidency of George W. Bush through mid-
2007.  Our historical survey seeks to trace the development over time of 
all three mechanisms essential to the classic theory of the unitary execu-
tive.  These include the president’s power of removal, the president’s 
power to direct subordinate executive officials, and the president’s power 
to nullify or veto subordinate executive officials’ exercise of discretionary 
executive power.3 
Calabresi and Yoo claim that their research shows that all forty-three 
presidents believed in the theory of the unitary executive as they de-
scribe it; that each acted in accordance with the theory; and that each 
prevailed on every occasion on which he was forced to defend the 
theory against assaults from the legislative branch.4  They also con-
tend that their research shows that “the executive branch’s consistent 
opposition to congressional incursions on the unitary executive has 
been sufficiently consistent and sustained to refute any suggestion of 
presidential acquiescence in derogations from the unitary execu-
tive.”5 
With a few important qualifications that I will discuss later, Cala-
bresi and Yoo effectively support all of their claims.  Before I discuss 
the evidence Calabresi and Yoo amass to support the claims made in 
their book, however, it is important to note the scope of their under-
taking and the important issues they choose not to address.  They ex-
plicitly exclude from the scope of their project claims that the Presi-
dent has inherent powers to act in the absence of statutory 
authorization or contrary to a statutory prohibition.  They state their 
belief that the President has some extremely limited inherent powers, 
but they express great skepticism about the claims of some other 
scholars that the President has broad inherent powers.  Their skepti-
cism borders on outright hostility when it comes to many of the 
claims of inherent power made by lawyers for the Bush administra-
tion: 
[T]he cost of the bad legal advice that [President Bush] received is that 
Bush has discredited the theory of the unitary executive by associating it 
not with presidential authority to remove and direct subordinate execu-
tive officials but with implied foreign policy powers, some of which, at 
least, the president simply does not possess.6 
Calabresi and Yoo also choose not to discuss other controversial in-
terpretations of Article II, including the many disputes with respect to 
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the Appointments Clause7 and the apparent belief of four Justices 
that the Take Care Clause precludes Congress from conferring on 
anyone except a member of the executive branch standing to obtain 
judicial review of any decision that implements a public law.8 
As I have explained in detail elsewhere, I agree with most of the 
views that Calabresi and Yoo express with respect to the unitary ex-
ecutive theory, including the view that the President has the power to 
remove any executive branch officer and the power to direct any ex-
ecutive branch officer to act in accordance with the policies preferred 
by the President as long as those policies are within constitutional 
and statutory boundaries.9  I am delighted that their painstaking re-
search has revealed that every President has shared those views and 
acted in accordance with those views. 
I.  THE PRESIDENT CANNOT VETO A DECISION MADE BY AN EXECUTIVE 
BRANCH OFFICER 
I disagree with Calabresi and Yoo on a few points, however.  In 
their version of the unitary executive theory, the President has the 
power to “nullify or veto subordinate executive officials’ exercise of 
executive power.”10  I do not believe that the President has such a 
power.  I believe instead that, when Congress has lawfully vested deci-
sion-making power in an executive branch officer, e.g., the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services or the Environmental Protection 
Agency Administrator, that executive branch officer is the only per-
son who can make the decision.  In that situation, the only recourse 
 
 7 See, e.g., Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 537 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 
2008) (illustrating a D.C. circuit panel divide on whether provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act that create Public Company Accounting Oversight Board violate the Appointments 
Clause). 
 8 Justice Scalia described this theory in detail in Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as 
an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881 (1983).  Four Jus-
tices appeared to adopt the theory in the plurality opinion in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (“To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public in-
terest in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’ vindicable 
in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief 
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed . . . .’”). 
 9 See RICHARD PIERCE, JR., 1 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 2.4–2.5 (4th ed. 2002); Rich-
ard J. Pierce, Jr., Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government, 
1988 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 23, 25 (1988) (noting that “officers whose responsibilities include 
both policymaking and some significant role in adjudicatory proceedings can be the sub-
ject of ‘for cause’ limits on the President’s removal power, but ‘cause’ must include fail-
ure to comply with any valid policy decision made by the President or his agent”). 
 10 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 14. 
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the President has is to remove the executive branch officer and re-
place him or her with someone who will act in accordance with the 
President’s views of wise policy. 
Peter Strauss has argued persuasively that the President has the 
power to remove subordinates but not the power to veto the decisions 
of subordinates.11  Calabresi and Yoo say nothing that persuades me 
that they are right and Strauss is wrong on this point.  In fact, they say 
little about the issue beyond their conclusory statement that the Pres-
ident has the power to veto or nullify decisions made by executive 
branch officers.  They also provide little evidence that any President 
has asserted such a power or attempted to exercise such a power. 
On a recent occasion, I personally observed a representative of 
the President acknowledge the accuracy of Strauss’s position.  The 
occasion was a panel discussion of Executive Order 13,42212 during 
the spring 2008 meeting of the American Bar Association Section of 
Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice.  During the discussion, a 
critic of the Order argued that the President was overreaching.  The 
Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
(“OIRA”)—in the Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)—
responded by saying that he could not understand what all the fuss 
was about as it was clear that the only mechanism the president can 
use to obtain compliance from any agency is the power of removal.13 
The difference between the power to veto and the power to re-
move is not subtle.  If a President could veto a decision of an execu-
tive branch officer, he undoubtedly would do so with some frequency 
and often at little political cost.  By contrast, removing an officer is 
always costly.  Frequently, the cost of removal is so high that a Presi-
dent reluctantly acquiesces in a decision with which he strongly dis-
agrees in order to avoid incurring the high cost of removing the ex-
ecutive branch officer responsible for the decision.  Though 
discussed at length in a subsequent part of this Article, an example 
here illustrates the potentially high cost of removal.  I believe that 
President Nixon’s unquestionably lawful decisions to remove Attor-
ney General Elliot Richardson, Acting Attorney General William 
Ruckelshaus, and indirectly, Special Counsel Archibald Cox cost him 
 
 11 Peter Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”?  The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 696, 759–60 (2007) (“[I]n the ordinary world of domestic administration, where 
Congress has delegated responsibilities to a particular governmental actor it has created, 
that delegation is a part of the law whose faithful execution the President is to assure.  
Oversight, and not decision, is his responsibility.” (footnote omitted)). 
 12 See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (Jan. 18, 2007). 
 13 Administrator’s statement has been paraphrased. 
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the presidency.  By contrast, President Clinton survived a similar 
scandal by prudently refraining from removing Attorney General Ja-
net Reno and replacing her with someone who would remove Ken 
Starr from the Whitewater investigation.  Clinton understood that his 
decision would cost him far more than allowing Starr to continue the 
Whitewater investigation. 
II.  THE PRESIDENT HAS NOT ALWAYS PREVAILED 
Calabresi and Yoo claim that the President has always prevailed in 
his many battles with Congress over the removal power: 
Big fights about whether the Constitution grants the president the re-
moval power have erupted frequently, but each time the president in 
power has claimed that the Constitution gives the president power to re-
move and direct subordinates in the executive branch.  And each time 
the president has prevailed, and Congress has backed down.14 
This is a questionable characterization of a complicated body of 
case law.  Calabresi and Yoo implicitly recognize in other parts of 
their book that the President has lost three major battles regarding 
the removal power.15  Three times the Court has upheld statutory lim-
its on the President’s removal power; none of those cases has been 
overruled.16  The President continues to be subject to statutory limits 
on his power to remove many executive branch officers.  Moreover, 
over the last half century no President has challenged those judicially-
approved limits on his removal power by attempting to remove any of 
the many executive branch officers that are subject to such limits. 
In each of the three cases in which the President did not prevail, 
the Court held that the President could remove the executive branch 
officer only for cause.  For reasons that I will discuss in detail in a sub-
sequent part of this Article, I do not consider the for-cause limit on 
the President’s power to remove some executive branch officers im-
 
 14 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 4. 
 15 See id. at 9 (proposing that Presidents should continue to “challenge unconstitutional lim-
its on the removal power . . . notwithstanding judicial decisions we discuss below, like 
Morrison v. Olson and Humphrey’s Executor, that are inconsistent with the unitary executive” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 16 See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–93 (1988) (holding that the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act of 1978 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine by restricting the At-
torney General’s power to remove independent counsel to instances of “good cause”); 
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 356 (1958) (rejecting president’s removal of a War 
Claims Commission member solely in the interest of replacing him with his personal se-
lection); Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629–32 (1935) (holding 
that a President’s ability to remove heads of agencies, which are not purely executive in 
nature, is constitutionally limited). 
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portant.  Unlike Calabresi and Yoo, I do not believe that limit has any 
real effect on the President’s ability to control policy making in the 
executive branch. 
If we set aside the three cases in which the Supreme Court held 
that Congress can impose a for-cause limit on the President’s power 
to remove some executive branch officers, Calabresi and Yoo’s claim 
is accurate.  The Court has never upheld a statute that precludes the 
President, or an agent of the President, from removing an executive 
branch officer for cause, and the Court has repeatedly held unconsti-
tutional statutes that give Congress any role in the process of remov-
ing an executive branch officer.17  Calabresi and Yoo argue that any 
for-cause limit on the President’s removal power is unconstitutional 
and is inconsistent with the unitary executive theory.18  I do not con-
sider for-cause limits unconstitutional or inconsistent with the unitary 
executive theory.  Thus, ironically, while Calabresi and Yoo’s claim 
that Presidents have prevailed in each case in which they have fought 
with Congress about the removal power is inaccurate, given their ver-
sion of the unitary executive theory, it is accurate in the context of my 













 17 See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726–27 (1986) (holding that Congress retained con-
trol over the removal power, unconstitutionally intruding on the executive function); 
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161, 163–64 (1926) (holding that removal of execu-
tive officials and inferior officers is an executive function, upon which Congress may not 
infringe). 
 18 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 4 (“Under this practice [of construing the Constitu-
tion as vesting the removal power in a unitary executive], congressional efforts to insulate 
executive branch subordinates from presidential control by creating independent agen-
cies and counsels are in essence unconstitutional.”). 
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III.  THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE THEORY DOES NOT ENSURE THAT 
AGENCIES ACT IN A CONSISTENT MANNER AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
THE PRESIDENT’S POLICY PREFERENCES 
Unlike Calabresi and Yoo, I believe that for-cause limits on the 
President’s power to remove some executive branch officers are con-
stitutional and are consistent with the unitary executive theory.  Fur-
thermore, Calabresi and Yoo make a powerful and sweeping norma-
tive, instrumental claim about the effects of the unitary executive 
theory:  “The Constitution’s creation of a unitary executive eliminates 
conflicts in law enforcement and regulatory policy by ensuring that 
all of the cabinet departments and agencies that make up the federal 
government will execute the law in a consistent manner and in ac-
cordance with the president’s wishes.”19  That statement is theoreti-
cally true, but we now know that this is one of the areas in which 
there is a large gap between theory and reality. 
Like most legal academics, Calabresi and Yoo assume that the 
President exercises control over the bureaucracy primarily through 
the systematic, relatively transparent processes described in Executive 
Orders 12,291, 12,866, and 13,422.  Those Executive Orders author-
ize the OIRA to take a variety of actions to implement the President’s 
preferred policies.  If that process was the primary means through 
which the President exercised control over the bureaucracy, Calabre-
si and Yoo’s description of the effects of presidential control might be 
a reasonably good first approximation of reality.  If the President ex-
ercised control primarily through OIRA, it would be safe to assume 
that policy directives from the White House to agencies would be 
consistent and would reflect the policy preferences of the President.  
The transparent systematic control mechanisms used by OIRA to con-
trol the bureaucracy, however, are not now, and never have been, the 
most important means through which Presidents, and presidential 
subordinates who purport to be acting on behalf of the President, ex-
ercise control over the bureaucracy.  Largely invisible ad hoc White 
House jawboning is now, and always has been, far more important in 
its impact on agency policy decisions. 
If any doubt existed about the relative importance of ad hoc jaw-
boning by the White House, two studies published in the last year 
should end any debate about the subject.  Lisa Bressman and Michael 
Vandenbergh conducted an empirical study of all contacts between 
the White House and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
 
 19 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 3. 
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during the administrations of President George H. W. Bush and Pres-
ident Bill Clinton.20  They found that eighteen White House offices—
in addition to OIRA—attempted to control policy making at EPA 
during that period.21  They also found that the various White House 
offices often tried to persuade EPA to adopt different policies.22  
Moreover, while OIRA was the most frequent source of White House 
influence and had the greatest effect on relatively routine policy deci-
sions, other White House offices had more influence over the most 
important policy decisions made by the EPA.23 
Jo Becker and Barton Gellman, two investigative reporters for the 
Washington Post, conducted the second study that provides a window 
on White House control of agency policy decisions.24  They found that 
Vice President Dick Cheney exercised extraordinary power over 
agency policy making by using a clever, extremely low visibility proc-
ess.25  Vice President Cheney first persuaded President Bush to ap-
point over two dozen people who were personally loyal to Vice Presi-
dent Cheney to policy-making positions in many agencies.  He then 
exercised control over many agency policy decisions by calling one of 
his people at an agency and persuading him or her to make a deci-
sion that reflected his policy preferences.26  Thus, for instance, the 
Department of the Interior reversed a prior decision concerning the 
balance between farming and fisheries’ interests in the operation of 
dams as a result of Vice President Cheney’s communications with the 
Department’s nineteenth ranking official.  Most of Cheney’s highly 
successful efforts to control agency policy decisions were unknown to 
the head of the agency involved, much less to President Bush.  We 
will never know the extent to which Cheney’s highly effective means 
of exercising control over many agency policy decisions produced 
policies preferred by President Bush. 
The findings of these two studies should not come as any great 
surprise to anyone familiar with the White House, the bureaucracy, 
 
 20 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State:  A Critical 
Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 68 (2006) (describing OIRA 
and other executive office involvement in and jockeying for influence in the EPA rule-
making). 
 21 Id. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 Jo Becker & Barton Gellman, Leaving No Tracks, WASH. POST, June 27, 2007, at A1 (de-
scribing a number of cases in which the Vice President personally intervened to ensure 
that federal government policies aligned with the administration’s political philosophy). 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. 
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and the relationship between the two.  The dramatic increase in the 
size and scope of the sprawling bureaucracy that occurred over the 
past century was followed by an analogous increase in the size and 
scope of the now sprawling White House bureaucracy.  Over the same 
period, the number of political employees within the bureaucracy al-
so has increased dramatically—tenfold between 1960 and 2000 and 
fourfold between 1990 and 2000.27  The net result is a massive White 
House bureaucracy that influences agency policy making through 
communications among thousands of political appointees. 
It is simply impossible for the President to control the White 
House, much less the bureaucracy.  There are not enough hours in 
the day for the President to be aware of more than a tiny fraction of 
the policy decisions made by agencies every day.  Moreover, the chain 
of agency relationships between the President and the people who ac-
tually make policy decisions in the bureaucracy is far too long to in-
dulge the assumption that everyone in the White House who pur-
ports to speak for the President is acting consistently with the 
President’s policy preferences. 
Despite the yawning gap between Calabresi and Yoo’s normative 
instrumental claims for the unitary executive theory and reality, I 
share their belief that presidential control over agency policy making 
is highly desirable.  It increases to some uncertain extent the degree 
of coordination and consistency in the bureaucracy and the degree of 
convergence between the policies adopted by agencies and the poli-
cies preferred by the President.  As in all other contexts, it is impor-
tant not to allow the perfect to be the enemy of the good. 
IV.  FOR-CAUSE LIMITS ON THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REMOVE 
OFFICERS ARE NOT IMPORTANT 
Calabresi and Yoo repeatedly emphasize their strong belief that 
the President has, and must have, an unqualified power to remove an 
executive branch subordinate.28  I agree that the President must have 
the power to remove any executive branch officer and that Congress 
cannot be allowed to give itself any role in the removal process.  I am 
pleased that the Supreme Court has acted in a manner consistent 
with that view.  I disagree with Calabresi and Yoo, however, to the ex-
 
 27 PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY:  WHY PRIVATIZATION OF GOVERNMENT 
FUNCTIONS THREATENS DEMOCRACY AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 164 (2007) (noting 
that “President Kennedy had 286 political leadership positions to fill, President Clinton 
914, and President George W. Bush 3,361”). 
 28 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 4–7. 
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tent that they argue that Congress cannot impose a for-cause limit on 
the President’s power to remove some executive branch officers and 
to the extent that they argue that the President can remove without 
cause executive branch employees who have no policy making re-
sponsibility.  I believe that the President can control policy making 
within the executive branch even though he does not have plenary 
power to remove every executive branch subordinate. 
In three cases, the Court has held that Congress can limit the 
President’s power to remove an executive branch officer by requiring 
the President to state a cause for removal if Congress identifies an 
adequate functional rationale to support such a limitation, e.g., the 
agency adjudicates disputes involving private rights,29 the agency pro-
vides advice to Congress,30 or the agency has responsibility to investi-
gate and/or prosecute alleged criminal wrongdoing at a high level in 
the executive branch.31  I do not believe that the for-cause limits the 
Court upheld in those cases are inconsistent with the unitary execu-
tive theory or preclude the President from controlling policy making 
within the executive branch.  In fact, I think they have little, if any, 
effect on the President’s ability to control executive branch policy 
making. 
The vast majority of executive branch officers have three reasons 
to act in accordance with the President’s policy preferences inde-
pendent of the President’s removal power.  All were either appointed 
or nominated by the President because of some combination of three 
characteristics—agreement with the President on policy issues related 
to their areas of responsibility, long-time loyalty to the President’s po-
litical party, and/or personal loyalty to the President.  As a result, 
Presidents rarely need to resort to explicit or implicit threats to re-
move an officer to persuade the officer to act in accordance with the 
President’s policy preferences.  On the unusual occasion when an of-
ficer feels so strongly about a policy issue that the President is unable 
to persuade the officer to act in accordance with the President’s pol-
icy preferences, I do not believe that the legal requirement that the 
President state a cause for removing the officer has any effect on the 
 
 29 Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958) (discussing the President’s ability to remove 
members of the War Claims Commission). 
 30 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (discussing the President’s 
abilty to remove members of the Federal Trade Commission).  At the time the Court de-
cided Humphrey’s Executor, Congress had no independent means of conducting an investi-
gation to determine whether there was a need to enact a new regulatory statute, so it was 
entirely dependent on the Federal Trade Commission to perform that function. 
 31 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988) (discussing the President’s ability to remove in-
dependent counsel in the Attorney General’s investigations). 
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President’s ability to use the threat of removal as an added means of 
inducing the officer to act in accordance with the President’s policy 
preferences. 
We know little about the contours of the for-cause limit on the 
President’s removal power.  Thus, for instance, we do not know 
whether a court would be willing to review a President’s decision to 
remove an officer if the President stated that he removed the officer 
for cause, and we do not know whether an officer’s refusal to act in 
accordance with the President’s policy preferences qualifies as a suffi-
cient cause for removal.  I doubt that a court would be willing to re-
view a President’s decision to remove an officer for cause, but if it did 
review such a decision, I am confident that a court would conclude 
that refusal to comply with a President’s stated policies qualifies as 
sufficient cause for removal.  While I cannot prove that my beliefs are 
correct, no one can prove that they are incorrect.  Without knowing 
the answers to those critical questions, it is impossible to conclude 
that a for-cause limit on the removal power has any effect at all on the 
President’s ability to use an express or implied threat of removal as 
an added inducement in an effort to persuade an officer to act in ac-
cordance with the President’s policy preferences. 
We know so little about the for-cause limit on the removal power 
because there has never been any case in the 220 year history of the 
country in which a President has removed an officer for cause and 
the officer has refused to leave his position.  That gives rise to an im-
portant question.  Why have there been no cases of this type?  One 
possibility is that no President has ever encountered a situation in 
which he so disagreed with an officer who was subject to a for-cause 
limit that he wanted to remove the officer.  That seems highly unlike-
ly, given the thousands of people who have served in such positions.  
Another possibility is that every President reluctantly has concluded 
that he could not remove any officer who holds such a position no 
matter how strongly the President disagreed with the officer.  That 
seems equally unlikely, given the number and variety of occasions on 
which Presidents and officers subject to for-cause limitations on their 
removal must have disagreed on important issues of policy. 
A third potential explanation exists that I find far more plausi-
ble—some uncertain percentage of the thousands of “voluntary res-
ignations” of such officers were not as voluntary as they appeared to 
outside observers.  Imagine that you are an executive branch officer 
who reaches an impasse with your President with respect to some im-
portant policy issue.  The President asks you to resign. You know that 
the President has the power to remove you.  You may or may not 
know whether you are subject to a for-cause limit on your removal.  I 
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doubt that many executive branch officers even know whether they 
are subject to such a limit.  Would you hire a lawyer to determine 
your rights and to fight to retain your job?  That would put you at 
odds with the person who appointed you, who is almost always some-
one you respect and admire as well as the head of your political party.  
It also would expose you to the risk of extreme embarrassment if the 
President then specifies a cause to remove you, as well as the risk of 
incurring the wrath of many of your old friends and fellow party 
members for taking an action that many would consider an act of ex-
treme disloyalty.  You would pay an extremely high cost for doing that 
which no one in your position has ever chosen to do—launch a legal 
fight to retain your job. 
Now consider the alternative.  You can agree to resign and to be 
honored by the President in a Rose Garden ceremony at which the 
President lavishes praise on you and regrets your decision to resign to 
spend more time with your family.  You then can accept one of the 
many job offers that pay five to ten times your current salary and 
leave the administration with an impeccable reputation both with the 
public and in your political party. 
It is hard to imagine any officer who would give more than a mo-
ment’s thought to the high cost option of litigating to try to retain his 
job with such an attractive alternative.  Thus, I am quite confident 
that that is why there has never been a case in which a President has 
specified a cause to remove an officer and the officer has relied on a 
for-cause limit on the President’s removal power as the basis to chal-
lenge the legality of the President’s decision.  The absence of any 
case of that type in over two centuries persuades me that the presence 
or absence of a for-cause limit on the President’s power to remove an 
executive officer is of little, if any, consequence to the President’s 
ability to maintain control over policy making in the executive 
branch. 
V.  FOR-CAUSE LIMITS ON THE PRESIDENT’S POWER TO REMOVE 
EMPLOYEES ARE NOT IMPORTANT 
Calabresi and Yoo also argue that the unitary executive theory re-
quires the President to have an unlimited power to remove executive 
branch employees, as well as officers.32  They argue that the statutory 
limits on removal of civil servants actually do not limit the President’s 
power to remove employees because they have been, and should be, 
 
 32 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 422–23. 
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interpreted only to prohibit the President from removing an em-
ployee because he refuses to contribute to political campaigns.33  
They do not support this claim with the abundant high quality evi-
dence on which they rely to support most of their other claims, and 
this claim is contradicted by both precedents and long-standing prac-
tice. 
The law is particularly clear with respect to the statutory limits on 
the President’s power to remove an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).  
As I have described at length elsewhere,34 the statutory for-cause limit 
on the President’s power to remove an ALJ has existed since 1946; it 
has been consistently interpreted to have a meaning far broader than 
Calabresi and Yoo claim and so broad that it is at least as difficult to 
remove an ALJ as it is to impeach an Article III judge; and, no Presi-
dent has ever tested that broad limit on his removal power by at-
tempting to remove an ALJ without specifying a cause. 
Unlike statutory limits on the President’s power to remove offi-
cers, statutory limits on the President’s power to remove employees 
have real effects on the conduct of Presidents and employees.  Em-
ployees are in dramatically different circumstances from officers, and 
each of the many differences between the two groups increases sig-
nificantly the likelihood that an employee will obtain counsel and liti-
gate in response to an attempt to remove him.  Unlike most officers, 
most employees were not appointed by the President, have no per-
sonal loyalty to the President, have no loyalty to the President’s party, 
are unlikely to suffer social or professional harm as a result of chal-
lenging a removal decision, and are unlikely to have financially at-
tractive alternatives to their government jobs.  Thus, while only a 
handful of officers have ever challenged a presidential removal deci-
sion, employees often challenge decisions to remove them. 
I believe that the broad statutory limits on the President’s power 
to remove employees are consistent with the unitary executive theory 
and do not interfere with the President’s ability to control policy 
making in the executive branch for one simple reason.  Employees 
do not have the power to make policy decisions.  That is the primary 
distinction between employees and officers.35 
 
 33 Id. at 422. 
 34 See PAUL VERKUIL ET AL., THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE JUDICIARY 124–65 (1992); Richard 
J. Pierce, Jr., Political Control Versus Impermissible Bias in Agency Decisionmaking:  Lessons from 
Chevron and Mistretta, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 481, 504–15 (1990). 
 35 Pierce, supra note 9, at 20–40.  In Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the 
court held that ALJs are employees rather than officers.  I sometimes include a question 
on my final exam in Administrative Law in which I ask students to evaluate the legality of 
one of the many legislative proposals to give ALJs greater power to make final policy deci-
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VI.  POLITICAL OBSTACLES TO USE OF THE PRESIDENT’S REMOVAL 
POWER ARE FORMIDABLE 
While legal obstacles to the use of the President’s removal power 
are insignificant in their effects, political obstacles are often formida-
ble.  Calabresi and Yoo appear to agree with me on this point.  They 
refer to many situations in which Presidents have faced major politi-
cal obstacles to removal and to others in which Presidents erred by 
exercising the removal power in circumstances in which the cost of 
exercising the power was far too high.  The famous incidents to 
which they refer include President Nixon’s fatal decision to remove 
Attorney General Elliot Richardson, Acting Attorney General William 
Ruckelshaus, and special counsel Archibald Cox when Cox seemed to 
be on the verge of uncovering President Nixon’s role in the Water-
gate scandal, and President George W. Bush’s decision to remove 
seven U.S. Attorneys—a decision that Calabresi and Yoo characterize 
as one through which the Bush administration “badly wounded itself” 
and from which “it will never fully recover.”36  In each case, there was 
no legal obstacle to the exercise of the removal power; yet, the politi-
cal costs of exercising the removal power were so high that they 
posed a threat to the viability and/or continued efficacy of the presi-
dential administration. 
Calabresi and Yoo also identify one of the variables that can cause 
the political cost of removing an executive branch officer to be par-
ticularly high37—whether the opposition party controls the Senate.  
They argue that President Clinton would have removed Janet Reno as 
Attorney General if Democrats had controlled the Senate at the time.  
Even though President Clinton disliked Reno and wanted to remove 
her, Calabresi and Yoo express their belief that he declined to do so 
out of concern that the ensuing hearings on potential confirmation 
of her successor would have been too embarrassing and politically 
costly.  That explanation is plausible as at least one factor that influ-
enced President Clinton’s decision, and the identity of the party that 
controls the Senate undoubtedly is one of the variables that deter-
mines the magnitude of the political cost of removing an officer. 
We have seen a more recent example of the importance of this va-
riable in the obvious reluctance of President George W. Bush to re-
 
sions that bind agencies.  The good students apply the case law under the Appointments 
Clause and conclude that all such proposals would be unconstitutional because they 
would convert ALJs into officers by conferring on them power to make policy decisions. 
 36 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 414. 
 37 Id. at 8. 
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move Attorney General Gonzales.  President Bush eventually re-
moved Gonzales but long after his incompetence and tendency to-
ward prevarication had made him a major liability to the administra-
tion.  The delay in removing Gonzales undoubtedly was motivated in 
part by the difficulty the administration encountered in finding a po-
tential replacement who would testify at his confirmation hearing in a 
way that would allow him to be confirmed but that would not impli-
cate President Bush in felonious conduct.  If the nominated replace-
ment for Attorney General Gonzales testified that water boarding is 
not torture, he would not be confirmed.  If he testified that water-
boarding is torture, he implicitly would be accusing President Bush of 
violating several statutes, including statutes that make it a crime to 
engage in torture.  Unsurprisingly, the administration had difficulty 
finding someone who would profess to have views on the meaning of 
torture that were so contingent and non-committal that he could be 
confirmed without implicating the President in criminal wrongdoing. 
Other variables also affect the magnitude of the political costs of 
removing an officer.  For instance, President Bush’s desire to avoid 
shining a spotlight on unpopular administration practices, like tor-
ture and widespread violations of individual rights, motivated, in part, 
his delayed removal of Attorney General Gonzales.  Even if Republi-
cans had controlled the Senate, confirmation hearings for a new At-
torney General would have drawn  attention to these publicly and po-
litically unpopular practices. 
Similarly, President Clinton’s desire to avoid political backlash 
and public scrutiny, in addition to a Republican-controlled Senate, 
tempered his desire to remove Attorney General Reno.  President 
Clinton wanted to remove Reno for several reasons, including for the 
level of her cooperation with Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, 
during his investigation of alleged presidential wrongdoing.  Presi-
dent Clinton would have much preferred that the Starr investigation 
end.  It is thus ironic that the ongoing and constantly expanding na-
ture of the Starr investigation undoubtedly was among the reasons 
President Clinton concluded that the cost of removing Reno would 
be too high. 
The independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government 
Act required an Independent Counsel to “comply with 
the . . . policies of the Department of Justice.”38  The statute also au-
thorized the Attorney General to remove an independent counsel for 
 
 38 Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039, 2041 
(1983). 
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cause.  It would have been child’s play for any Attorney General to 
identify some respect in which Independent Counsel Starr’s wide-
ranging investigation violated one of the Department of Justice’s 
thousands of policies.  President Clinton easily could have named 
someone to be Acting Attorney General who would have removed 
Starr for allegedly violating a Department of Justice policy.  Thus, he 
could have followed President Nixon’s lead and removed Attorney 
General Reno, and each of her replacements in the line of succession 
at the Department, until he found someone willing to remove Inde-
pendent Counsel Starr for cause.  I doubt that any court would find a 
legal flaw in that sequence of actions.  Furthermore, President Clin-
ton would have been delighted at two of the results—removal of At-
torney General Reno and removal of Independent Counsel Starr. 
Yet, President Clinton understood that the cost of removing any-
one who had a major role in investigating his conduct would have 
been intolerably high.  He did not want to meet the same fate as Pres-
ident Nixon.  He concluded that he would be better off leaving Reno 
and Starr in office and fighting a public relations war against Starr.  
History has demonstrated that President Nixon underestimated the 
cost of removing officers with roles in investigating the President, 
while President Clinton evidenced a good understanding of the cost 
of such a removal decision. 
Many other incidents illustrate the often high political cost of re-
moving an officer.  On at least three occasions, President Reagan and 
Secretary of State Shultz had highly visible disagreements about ma-
jor issues.  Secretary Shultz prevailed on each one.39  For instance, 
when President Reagan ordered polygraph tests to be administered 
to 4,500 personnel at the State Department in an effort to discover 
the source of an embarrassing leak, Secretary Shultz called a press 
conference at which he angrily announced that no one at the State 
Department would submit to a polygraph.40  President Reagan had 
every legal right to remove Secretary Shultz without specifying any 
cause, but instead, he backed down. 
President Reagan’s decision stemmed from his belief that he 
would pay an intolerably high cost if he were to remove Secretary 
Shultz.  The total political cost of removing Schultz would be the sum 
of three components:  the cost in the form of loss of the services of an 
officer whose services the President valued highly; the cost in the 
form of reduced respect for the President in the foreign relations 
 
 39 Terry Atlas, Shultz Offered 3 Times to Resign, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1987, at 4. 
 40 Shultz Took Vigorous Stand On Lie Tests, BOSTON GLOBE,  July 24, 1987, at 4. 
610 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 12:2 
 
community because of the community’s high regard for the Secre-
tary; and the cost in the form of reduced public popularity of the 
President, because many members of the public were likely to side 
with the Secretary on the issue of whether mass polygraphing of 
thousands of people was an appropriate response to a leak. 
Each of those costs is generalizable to the other cases in which 
Presidents have to consider the many ways in which a decision to re-
move an officer might impose high costs on him.  In all such cases, a 
President must consider carefully the value of the services of the offi-
cer, the popularity of the officer in some important community, the 
risk that the public might side with the officer with respect to the is-
sue on which the two differ, the potential problems the President 
might encounter in attempting to persuade the Senate to confirm a 
replacement for the officer, the risk that the ensuing confirmation 
hearings will be embarrassing to the President, and the risk that the 
public might draw the inference that the removal decision is part of 
an effort to cover up, or block investigation of, wrongdoing by the 
President or senior members of his administration. 
Of course, each case is unique.  President George W. Bush in-
curred only modest political costs after he removed Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (“FEMA”) Director Michael Brown, fol-
lowing FEMA’s utterly incompetent response to the Hurricane 
Katrina disaster; Director Brown has publicly criticized President 
Bush on many occasions since his removal from office. The political 
costs of not removing Director Brown, however, far outweighed the 
costs of removing him. 
It is highly unlikely that any President ever gives serious thought 
to the presence or absence of a for-cause limit on his removal power 
in making a decision to remove an officer.  That legal technicality is 
inconsequential in the high-stakes world of Presidential politics.  The 
strength of the political limits on the President’s removal power de-
pends on many variables, but those costs are completely independent 
of any legal limits.  The political limits on the President’s removal 
power are indispensable to the proper functioning of a democracy.  
They provide a means through which the public can hold the presi-
dent politically accountable for his actions. 
 
VII.  FOR-CAUSE LIMITS ARE UNRELATED TO THE “INDEPENDENT 
AGENCY” PROBLEM 
Calabresi and Yoo refer to so-called “independent agencies” as an 
illustration of the problems that can be created by for-cause limits on 
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the President’s removal power.41  Like most legal academics, they 
equate the concept of an independent agency with statutory for-cause 
limits on the President’s power to remove an agency head.  Calabresi 
and Yoo characterize as unconstitutional and inconsistent with the 
unitary executive theory the Supreme Court’s famous decision in 
Humphrey’s Executor,42 in which the Court upheld the statutory for-
cause limit on the President’s power to remove an FTC Commis-
sioner.43 
To their credit, Calabresi and Yoo acknowledge that no evidence 
demonstrates that independent agencies are less responsive to the 
policy preferences of the President than are agencies headed by offi-
cers who can be removed without any stated cause.44  In discussing the 
administrations of President Reagan and President Clinton, they 
note:  “At times it even seemed that presidential appointees in inde-
pendent agencies were more committed to the administration’s pol-
icy program than were the president’s own cabinet secretaries.”45  Ca-
labresi and Yoo seem surprised by the absence of evidence that 
“independent agencies” are any more “independent” of the President 
in the policy making context.46  That dearth of evidence fits well with 
my belief that the presence or absence of a for-cause limit on the 
President’s removal power has no significant effect on the President’s 
ability to persuade executive branch officers, including commission-
ers of independent agencies, to act in accordance with the Presi-
dent’s policy preferences. 
Even if we indulge the plausible assumption that independent 
agencies are more difficult for Presidents to control than other agen-
cies, the for-cause limit on the President’s removal power is unlikely 
to be a significant factor in explaining the difference between inde-
pendent agencies and agencies that are headed by officers who are 
subject to an unlimited removal power.  Independent agencies differ 
from other agencies in other respects that better explain any differ-
ence in the President’s ability to persuade them to act in accordance 
with the President’s policy preferences.  Independent agencies are 
headed by multi-member collegial bodies.  Each member, usually 
called a Commissioner, is appointed for a term of years, with the 
terms staggered so that only one Commissioner’s term expires every 
 
 41 See CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 6. 
 42 See id. at 9. 
 43 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). 
 44 CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 1, at 6–8. 
 45 Id. at 7–8. 
 46 Id. at 6–8. 
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year.  The statutes that establish independent agencies limit the Pres-
ident’s appointment power by providing that no more than a bare 
majority of the Commissioners can be members of the same political 
party. 
As a practical matter, the statutory limit on the President’s ap-
pointment power requires the President to appoint two Commission-
ers who are members of the opposing party.  Moreover, if the Senate 
is controlled by the opposing party, the President often has no practi-
cal choice but to appoint a commissioner who has been chosen by 
the leaders of the opposing party as the price of persuading the Sen-
ate to confirm a Commissioner who has been chosen by the Presi-
dent.  It is certainly plausible that independent agencies headed by 
five-member collegial bodies, two of whom are likely to be political 
opponents of the President, are less likely to act in accordance with 
the President’s policy preferences than are agencies headed by indi-
viduals who have been chosen by the President.  Thus, to the extent 
that independent agencies interfere with the unitary executive theory 
by impairing the President’s ability to direct executive branch officers 
and agencies to act in accordance with the President’s policy prefer-
ences, the source of that problem lies not in the innocuous for-cause 
restriction on the President’s removal power but in the highly restric-
tive statutory limits on the President’s appointment power. 
I am confident that the statutory limits on the appointment power 
contained in all of the statutes that create independent agencies are 
unconstitutional.  So far, however, no one has been able to persuade 
a court to address that important question.  The D.C. Circuit has held 
that such limits are not justiciable except in the unlikely event that a 
President nominates and the Senate confirms more than a majority 
of members of such an agency who are members of the same party.47 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
In sum, I share Calabresi and Yoo’s belief in the importance of the 
unitary executive theory, the President’s power to remove executive 
branch officers, and the President’s ability to direct executive branch 
officers and agencies to act in accordance with the President’s policy 
preferences.  I congratulate them on writing an excellent book that 
makes two important contributions to the literature on the unitary 
executive theory.  First, they engage in a successful attempt to save 
the unitary executive theory from the bad odor that surrounds it to-
 
 47 FEC v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 6 F.3d 821, 825 (D.C. Cir. 1993). 
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day as a result of the Bush administration’s outlandish claims of pres-
idential power—claims that have no relation to the unitary executive 
theory.  Second, they demonstrate through careful historical research 
that every President in history has acted in a manner that is consistent 
with his belief in the unitary executive. 
I disagree with Calabresi and Yoo on only three major points.  
First, I do not believe that the President has the power to veto a deci-
sion made by an executive officer to whom Congress has delegated 
the decision.  If the President disagrees with such a decision his only 
recourse is to remove the officer. 
Second, I do not believe that the statutory for-cause limits on the 
President’s power to remove employees and some officers unconstitu-
tionally impair the President’s power to control policy making in the 
executive branch.  The for-cause limits on the President’s power to 
remove some officers do not have any adverse effect on the Presi-
dent’s ability to use the implicit or explicit threat of removal as one of 
the many means through which he can persuade an executive officer 
to act in accordance with his policy preferences.  The only legal limits 
on the President’s power to remove officers that the Court has up-
held are innocuous in their effects on the President’s ability to con-
trol policy making in the executive branch.  The political obstacles to 
removal of an officer are often formidable, but they are both unre-
lated to any legal limits on the President’s removal power, and so-
cially beneficial through their effects on presidential accountability to 
the electorate. 
The legal limits on the President’s power to remove executive 
branch employees that the courts have consistently upheld have no 
adverse effects on the President’s power to control policy making in 
the executive branch for a different reason—by definition, employees 
have no power to make policy decisions. 
Finally, I believe that any unconstitutional impairment of the Pres-
ident’s power to control policy making by “independent agencies” is 
attributable to statutory limits on the President’s appointment powers 
rather than to statutory limits on his removal power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
